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CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE:
A TOOL OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
FRANK E. HoRAciK, JR.*
From the start, the Supreme Court of the United States has con-
sidered the interpretation of the Constitution as "the very essence of
judicial duty."' The authoritative character of its constitutional in-
terpretation is no longer questioned seriously.2 And this is as it
should be in a government founded upon the principles of a written
constitution; not only because of the need of finality, but also because
of the impracticability of constitutional amendment.
Wise as were the framers of the Constitution they were unable
to visualize most of the problems of the middle nineteenth century-
much less those of the twentieth. Thus, with constitutional change
a necessity and amendatory machinery cumbersome, the choice of
informal amending machinery rested between the Court and Congress.
Logically, to have chosen Congress-the policy-determining branch-
would have been the more appropriate; but to have selected the legis-
lature as the amending agency would have done violence to the con-
cept of the supremacy of a written constitution. Marshall wisely
counselled against following the dictates of logic, for, he said: "This
doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitu-
tions. . . . It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real
omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their
powers. . . .
Thus, the Court assumed the role of amendor through the role of
constitutional interpretation. Beginning in Marbury v. Madison, the
Court assumed the fixity of constitutional principle and conceived of
the interpretative function as merely the application of constitutional
doctrine. Within 13 years, however, the Court was admitting that
reasonable difference of opinion could exist as to the meaning of the
Constitution and that therefore more than one interpretation of the
*B.A., J.D., State University of Iowa; LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard University; Professor
of Law, Indiana University.
lMarbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137, 178 (U.S. 1803).
2C0rwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law (1914) 12 MICH.
L. REv. 247: Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review
(1914) 12 MIcH. L. R.v. 538; cf. McLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITION,
AND PARTIES (1912) 51-56.
3Marbury v. Madison, i Cr. 137, 178 (U.S. 1803).
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Constitution could be "correct."' If the Constitution could be in-
terpreted in more than one way it was obvious that more than one
source of interpretation was also valid, but primary reliance was
placed upon historical sources.
Time and change, however, made the framers' intention less com-
pelling and the historical approach was soon validly questioned as
denying to the Constitution "every quality except its age."5  Since
that date, varying philosophical, ethical, -social, and economic in-
terpretations have glossed the original instrument.,
Judges have held different postulates, the character and tempo of
society has shifted, and conflicting interpretations and decisions have
mounted until many now assert that the Court has abandoned all
regard for stare decisis and precedent.7 Disturbing as this may be to
many persons, it is inevitable that prior constitutional decisions must
on occasions be reversed if the Constitution itself is to remain a dy-
namic charter.of government. The Court's power to reverse a former
decision is clear; the only question open is the wisdom of its action.
Today, however, only a small part of the Court's function involves
constitutional interpretation. The construction of congressional en-
actments, administrative regulations, and executive orders occupies
a far larger area of judicial activity. Indeed, the need for constitu-
tional interpretation seldom arises without the correlative need of
statutory construction, for as Marshall said, "the Court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case."8
The interpretation of statutes, however, is founded on postulates
different from those underlying constitutional interpretation. Statu-
tory enactment is usually more nearly contemporaneous with litiga-
tion. The sources of legislative intent are more readily available. The
capacity of Congress to change legislative policy is real. On questions
4Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat. 304, 348 (U.S. 1816) "Judges of equal
learning and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a statute,
or a treaty of the United States, or even the Constitution itself."
5Hurtado v. United States, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884): ". . . it is better not to
go too far back into antiquity for the best securities for our 'ancient liberties.' It
is more consonant to the true philosophy of our historical institutions to say that
the spirit of personal liberty and individual right, which they embodied, was pre-
served and developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circum-
stances and situations. . . ."
*Wnas, THE CONSTrUTION OiP TH UNiTED STATES AT THE END op ONE
HuNnE FIrY YEAs (1939).
7Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisit and the Law of the Case
(1943) 21 TEXAS LAW REVIEw 514; Small, Stare Decisis on Two Continents (1946)
18 ROcy MT. L. REv. 97.
sMarbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137, 178 (U.S. 1803).
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of policy the Court is subordinate to the Congress, or at all events
should be.
If the doctrine of separation of power is valid, and judicial su-
premacy is essential to its preservation, then legislative supremacy
in matters of legislative policy is equally necessary. Otherwise under
the guise of law enforcement and interpretation, the Court in fact
dominates the legislative function. 9
Congress is capable of expressing itself on matters of policy and
is forever charged with the obligation of adjusting the statutes to the
wishes of the majority of the people. Thus, there is no need for the
Court to interpret a statute in the same manner as the Constitution
and there is also strong reason why it should not. For if the Court's
interpretation becomes a substitute for the determination of policy
by the legislature, then the Congress is in part relieved of its function
and its responsibility. This is not to say that the Court must accept
every congressional enactment as valid; but rather that if it finds
the statute valid it is bound by the legislative declaration of policy
and must interpret the statute as Congress intended it to be interpreted. 0
This, of course, is not a simple process. The Court is properly
hesitant to declare statutes unconstitutional and will therefore seek
such legislative intent as will eliminate the constitutional question.
But to avoid one evil is hardly a justification for the formulation of
another. And those of us who view the legislature as a primary
source of all policy formulation cannot help but look askance upon
a practice which is inevitably leading the Court into a position where
it not only becomes supreme within the constitutional realm but
also potentially dominant over legislative policy determination.
9
"In any case it is not lightly to be implied that Congress has . . . delegated
to this Court the responsibility of giving new content to language deliberately
readopted. . . . For us to make this assumption is to discourage, if not to deny,
legislative responsibility." Stone, C. I., dissenting in Girouard v. United States,
66 S.Ct. 826, 833 (1946). See Chicago & A. R. Co. v. United States, 49 Ct.Cls.
463, 500 (1914); United States v. National Ass'n Window Glass Manufacturers,
287 Fed. 228 (N.D. Ohio, 1923) for cases where interpretation becomes purely
policy determination. In Alco-Zander v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, 35 F.(2d) 203 (E.D.Penn. 1929) the court ignored the statute with the
same effect. -
10"If a law is plain, and within the legislative power, it declares itself, and
nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as upon every
citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the law must mean some-
thing different from the common import of its language, because the court may
think that its penalties are unwise or harsh would make the judicial superior to
the legislative branch of the government, and practically invest it with law-making
powers. The remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation but in amendment
or repeal." State v. Duggan, 15 R.I. 403, 409, 6 Atl. 787, 788 (1886).
249
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
I. -
A major premise of a representative democracy is that the people
may through their elected representatives determine the character
of their society, government and laws. By our Constitution, the rep-
resentatives of the people organized in the Congress are charged with
the legislative responsibility of formulating policies of social or-
ganization and conduct. Thus, a statute becomes a rule of law by
which the members of society must conduct their lives subject to
the penalties society imposes upon them through its law-enforcing
agencies. When enforcement results in a case in a court of law then
the Court, the same as the members of society, must comply with
the law and policy fixed by Congress. Inevitably this policy may
be general or precise, clear or ambiguous, and it is the obligation of
the Court to determine whether the case before it falls within the
policy of the statute or not."'
Thus, when we speak of determining legislative intent we are
saying that we are trying to determine from both intrinsic and ex-
trinsic sources the exact limits of the rule of conduct which Congress
has established." Difficult as this inquiry may be it is not, in most
cases, a fictional thing-an inquiry into the minds of individual
congressmen or the search for a "composite congressional mind"13"
but rather a determination from the action which Congress took or
refused to take, of the rules of conduct Congress actually fixed.
This inquiry is beset with many uncertainties and the ultimate
result may appear doubtful even to the Court, which is bound, at the
risk of being wrong, to make a decision. But when the decision is
made the statute to that extent becomes more determinate,' or, if
you will, amended to the extent of the Court's decision. The decision
and the attendant change in the law is a necessary consequence of
law enforcement. If it results in the exercise of certain legislative
""Note that this inquiry does not determine the exact decision of the court.
Once the policy is determined, the instant case may be determined to fall within
or without the coverage of the act, and if within it the court may still have con-
siderable latitude in determining the consequences attributable to the particular
facts of the case. See Pennsylvania R. R. v. United States Railroad Labor Board,
261 US. 72 (1923).
122 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucrIoN (3d ed. 1943) §§4501-4506.
IaBut see Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 Hav. L. REv. 863: ". . . the
intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense. .. ." Cf. Landis,
A Note on "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43 HAnv. L. REv. 886.
l4 Radin, supra note 13 at 869.
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functions by the Court it is the inescapable product of the judicial
process.15
The decision changes the rule of conduct under which society lives.18
The decision is neither formal nor theoretical-it is law. Men must
order their affairs by the new law. All the sanctions of society-
civil, criminal, administrative-will be marshaled to insure its vitality.
Thus, if the Court in a second case changes its former interpreta-
tion the functional consequences of the change are legislative rather
than judicial. At the time of the first decision a statute existed which
some asserted (and some denied) applied to a particular fact situation.
The exercise of the judicial function made it necessary for the Court
to determine the applicability of the statute. This required a deter-
mination and interpretation of the policy fixed by Congress.
After the decision, whether the Court correctly or incorrectly in-
terpreted the statute, the law consists of the statute plus the decision
of the Court. Thus, at the time a second case comes before the Court,
the law on the particular point is both clear and determinate. The
only undetermined question is whether the facts of the second case
bring it within the rule of the prior decision.
Even assuming that the prior interpretation was incorrect, if the
Court now reverses the position it took in the first case it is affirma-
tively changing an established rule of law under which society has
been operating. This is explicitly and unquestionably the exercise
of a legislative function. The correctness or incorrectness of the prior
rule is less important than the fact that the members of society have
acted upon it.
The judicial change of a legislative rule occurs without any of the
safeguards normally surrounding legislative action. The change is
not made by elected representatives. It is not formulated into a
written proposal upon which interested persons can express their
opinion formally before the committees of Congress or informally by
petition and through the press and on the air. There is no compliance
with the bicameral principle of equal state representation in the upper
'sThis situation should be clearly distinguished from the case where the Court
changes its interpretation after a prior decision. In the latter case the result is
not a necessary consequence of the judicial process. The burden of change can
be left to the legislative body.
16"The long time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially
construed, and the enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes
the judicial construction as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that
the judicial construction is the correct one." Stone, J. in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940).
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house and popular representation in the lower. There is no oppor-
tunity for executive veto.1?
These objections seem far more important than the objection that
the Court may have erred in its first decision. Unless Congress has
acted, neither the Court nor anyone else can determine whether or
not its interpretation was inconsistent with the intent of Congress.
When the second case arises the question is whether the Court made
a mistake in the first instance. And if it did, the question is whether
a subsequent Congress has concurred in the change of policy er-
roneously made by the Court. If in these circumstances the Court
reverses its prior decision it assumes the complete responsibility for
establishing a new and changed rule of law.18 It is exercising a
legislative function. And to this extent is asserting supremacy in
the legislative field subject only to the power of Congress to change
the judge-made law by statutory enactment.,,
But it may be objected that this is exactly what a court of law
does when it reverses a long line of decisions in a purely common-
law situation. That situation, however, is distinguishable. In the
first place, the common law is judge-made law. Secondly, the legis-
lature by custom and tradition has not generally ,exercised its ad-
mitted supremacy in the common-law areas. Likewise, courts have
held the doctrine of precedent in higher regard in this than in the
public law domain. Indeed, when courts are called upon to change
a common-law rule they usually decide in accordance with precedent
and observe that if there is need for remedy the proper forum is the
legislature and not the court.20 In other words, by self-limitation the
lIThe noncompliance of judicial action seems much more substantial than the
noncompliance resulting from congressional silence because it results in a change
in the rules of conduct of society. But see Rutledge, J., concurring in Cleveland v.
United States, 67 S.Ct. 13, 17, n. 5 (1946): "Legislative intent derived from
nonaction or 'silence' lacks all the supporting evidence of legislation enacted
pursuant to prescribed procedures including reduction of bills to writing, com-
mittee reports, debates, and reduction to final written form as well as voting
records and executive approval."
asSee note 9 supra.
lONote that it is not unreasonable for some congressmen to believe that after
an interpretation the legislature cannot change the meaning, some state courts
having held that a subsequent enactment redefining policy amounts to the exercise
of the judicial function of interpretation. Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil
Co., 122 Pa. 627, 15 Atl. 917 (1888). Contra: Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S.
668 (1881):
20The same concept is reflected in the policy against changing the interpretation
of a statute. See Brandeis, J. in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938):
"If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be pre-
pared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But
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judiciary has recognized that the change of those rules, under which
men have conducted their affairs and have assessed their rights and
liabilities, is a legislative function to be exercised by the elected
representatives of the people. And it is an insufficient answer that
the representatives have not changed or will not change the existing
policy of the law. So long as policy determination is their responsi-
bility, it is their privilege to act wisely or unwisely or not to act at all.
II.
The general problem was recently raised in the case of Girouard
v. United States.21 There a majority of the Court determined that
congressional inaction after judicial interpretation of congressional
enactment did not prevent the reversal of earlier decisions and the
establishment of a new policy. The problem arises in three reasonably
distinct situations:
1. Where after a Supreme Court decision the original act has
had no further legislative history.
2. Where after a prior decision the original act is re-enacted with-
out change.
3. Where after a prior decision the original act is amended by
Congress.
In the first place it should be quite clear that no formal dialectic-
amendment v. non-amendment, action v. non-action-should be de-
terminative of the question.22 The ouly valid inquiry is, what was
the legislative intent? Did the Court in the prior decision properly
interpret the congressional intent? If not, has there been subsequent
congressional acceptance of the Court's interpretation which amounts
to an amendment of the policy and the statute?
the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels
us to do so."
2166 S.Ct. 826 (1946). Girouard, a Seventh Day Adventist applied for citizen-
ship; he answered "no" to the question "If necessary, are you willing to take up
arms in defense of this country?" By decisions of the Court in United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929); -United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605
(1931); and United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931) the applicant was not
entitled to citizenship. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an order admitting
the applicant. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the prior deci-
sions and subsequent inaction of Congress not binding, Justices Stone, Reed and
Frankfurter, dissenting.
22Cf. Rutledge, J., concurring in Cleveland v. United States, 67 S.Ct. 13, 17, n. 4
(1946): "As an original matter in view of the specific and constitutional pro-
cedures required for the enactment of legislation, it would seem hardly justified
to treat as having legislative effect any action or nonaction not taken in accordance
with the prescribed procedures."
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The answers to these several questions will depend, in part, upon
principles of statutory interpretation, but more upon the relation
between the Court and Congress.
For example, those who support the decision in the Girouard case
argue in this fashion: after congressional enactment the Court in a
given case must determine whether the statute is applicable and,
if so, its meaning. In determining its meaning the Court must follow
the intent of Congress. If, after the Court has determined the legis-
lative intent, Congress takes no further action, there is no formal con-
gressional expression of approval or disapproval of the first interpreta-
tion. Therefore, in a subsequent case there is no additional legislative
intent which the court need consider binding. Consequently, so far
as the principles of statutory construction are concerned, the Court
is as free in the second case as it was in the first to. determine con-
gressional intent. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for the Court to
change its interpretation and reverse the prior decision if it decides
that that-decision was erroneous.
This proposition is carried one step further in the Girouard case
to include the situation where there has been re-enactment of the
original statute without any change in the act directly affecting the
question previously decided. It is argued that ir this situation there
is likewise no indication of legislative intent beyond that expressed-
in the first enactment and that therefore the re-enactment has no
greater significance than the silence or inaction of Congress considered
in the first example.28
The proposition obscures a more significant postulate which may
be stated thus: that in case of doubt the Court is accepting its own
determination of policy in preference to any interpretation which
may be drawn from subsequent congressional action.24  The result
is thatan affirmative duty is placed on Congress to express itself in
such positive and compelling language subsequent to a judicial in-
terpretation of the statute that the Court would be unable to escape the
2aCaminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). But note that the Court in the Girouard
case reversed its prior holding, while the same Court with Douglas, J., writing both
opinions refused to change the rule of Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470
(1916) in Cleveland v. United States, 67 S.Ct. 13 (1946).
24"Action" should include "inaction" for it has the same result. "Inaction"
continues the rule of law as originally interpreted. The rule is enforced during
the period of "legislative inaction" so that if enforcement is contrary to the legisla-
tive intent it should be anticipated that demands would arise for a change in the
rule.
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effect of its statement. In short, the Girouard case extends judicial su-
premacy into the field of legislative policy except in those instances
where Congress affirmatively and explicitly acts.
Those who find difficulty with the judicial method of the Girouard
decision emphasize the fact that the Court's function is not to de-
termine policy but to apply it and that as a consequence until Congress
indicates affirmatively that it is not satisfied with the result achieved
by prior judicial interpretation it must be presumed that the prior
interpretation is consistent with the original intent of Congress or
at least with the intent of subsequent Congresses.
Thus, unless there is evidence of change in congressional policy, it
must be assumed that the original decision reflects the intent of Con-
gress.2 5 A reversal of the original decision by the Court then amounts
to an amendment of the original act contrary to the intent of Congress,
with the result that the Court has asserted supremacy in the field of
legislative policy subject only to the ability of Congress to change the
interpretation by affirmative legislative action.
The supremacy of Congress is not completely defeated but it is
seriously limited. Many members of Congress feel that they are bound
by the Supreme Court's decisions even on questions of construction.
At all events the Court's decisions receive great weight.26 The result
is a functional supremacy of the Court if not a philosophical one.
If Congress is supreme in the realm of policy the view of Congress
and not that of the Court should prevail in cases of doubt. If Congress
is supreme on matters of policy the burden of going forward should
not be placed on its shoulders.
25Jackson, J. in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 389 (1942): "We think
if Congress had passed or intended to pass an act challenging a well known con-
stitutional decision of this Court there would appear at least one clear statement
of that purpose either from its proponents or its adversaries." See also Id. at 395,
400-401.
26For example, the same problem of change in rule arises in the case of admin-
istrative agencies. See 2 SurBEkr.m, STATUTORY CoNsTaucTroN (3d ed. 1943)
§5109; Brown, Regulations, Re-enactment, and the Revenue Acts (1941) 54 Hav.
L. Rav. 377; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 HAIv.
L. Rnv. 398. The administrative situation may be distinguished from the judicial
in several respects. First, Congress confers legislative functions on the agencies
to make rules and regulations. Thus, even if the agency exercised a legislative
power in its decisional capacity the exercise as a matter of substance though not
of procedure was within the power conferred. Secondly, an administrative agency
is popularly treated as an enforcement agency and its decisions are not considered
"law" in the same way as are those of the courts. Third, where the rule, be it
legislative or administrative, is of long standing the agencies have not been con-
sidered free to change them at least retroactively. A similar policy should be
appropriate for the Court.
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Viewed in this light the decision in the Girouard case is not de-
fensible. But it must be recognized that in an operating government
the powers of the several departments never remain separate nor
do the departments completely check and balance one another. Thus,
a practical and not a theoretical supremacy of either Court or Con-
gress is at issue.
Even those who support the Girouard opinion recognize that the
power there assumed should be cautiously exercised.27 The standards
of cautious exercise, however, cannot be easily defined. Some think,
for example, that it would be proper for the Court to reverse its prior
decision if the Court later concludes that the prior interpretation
produces an unconstitutional result. There is some suggestion of this
view running through the majority opinion in the Girouard case. 2 8
But quaere whether the constitutional question should be resolved
through statutory interpretation? It is, of course, generally conceded
that the Court should, where two or more interpretations are open
to it, choose that interpretation which sustains the validity of the
congressional enactment. There is both advantage and disadvantage
to the application of this rule in the instant problem. It permits the
Court to arrive at a result which to many is more attractive than the
result which the congressional legislation reached. It avoids the neces-
sity of declaring a statute unconstitutional; but the constitutional
question remains undecided. It leaves undetermined whether an
amendment by Congress reasserting the view of earlier cases, 28 a could
be reasserted constitutionally by Congress. And thus the decision pro-
vides little guidance on basic questions and amounts to little more
than a decision that Girouard was entitled to citizenship.
The final area of difficulty in which the majority opinion in the
Girouard case offers some administrative advantage is in that area
27But see, for example, Rutledge, J., concurring in Cleveland v. United States,
67 S.Ct. 13, 17 (1946): "Notwithstanding recent tendency, the idea cannot
always be accepted that Congress, by remaining silent and taking no afrmative
action in repudiation, gives approval to judicial misconstruction of its enactments."
.
28"The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an effort
to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual. . . .
Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product of that
struggle. . . . The test oath is abhorrent to our tradition. Over the years Congress
has meticulously respected that tradition and even in times of war has sought to
accommodate the military requirements to the religious scruples of the individual.
We do not believe that Congress intended to xeverse that policy when it came to
draft the naturalization oath. Such an abrupt and radical departure from our
traditions should not be implied." Douglas, J., 66 S.Ct. 826, 829 (1946).
28aE.g., United States v. Schwimmer, United States v. Macintosh, and United
States.v. Bland, cited and discussed in note 21 supra.
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where the legislative intent is so uncertain as to provide no guidance
for the Court at all. The void-for-vagueness rule,29 defensible as it
may be in some criminal cases, is certainly resting in well-deserved
disuse at the present time. And yet, implicit in any criticism of the
Girouard decision, is the suggestion that the Court should not act in
those areas where the congressional intent is in doubt either as a
matter of original enactment, subsequent silence, or subsequent re-
enactment without further particularized intent.
The doctrine of vagueness, however, results in a judicial decision-
a decision which determines that the statute does not apply to the
case before the Court. Thus the decision of the Court, no matter
how expressed, amounts to a holding that the legislature did not intend
to cover the instant situation. This is interpretation. And so here,
whatever decision the Court reaches amounts to the application or
non-application of the statute and to that extent an interpretation
of the intent of the legislature. Thus a determination that the sub-
sequent silence of Congress or its ambiguous inaction, amounts to a
reaffirmation of the Court's interpretation in the original case, is as
objectionable as the void-for-vagueness rule in that it purports not
to interpret while in fact it does. Thus if the question is one of
statutory construction alone it would be clear that the Court should
use all the evidence available in order to determine the exact way
in which Congress intended the statute to be applied. 0 And, if the
Court, having made this inquiry, arrived at a decision different there
should be no objection to it. The difficulty with the position, however,
is that it once again requires the Court to change the existing rules
of society and throws the burden on the legislature of going forward
affirmatively if its policy is to control the Court.
Implicit in the argument of the majority is the proposition that
Congress would often desire to change the Court's interpretation but
hesitates to do so for political reasons.,, There are two difficulties
2 9See United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1920); A. B. Small Co.
v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925); Aigler, Legislation in
Vague or General Terms (1923) 21 MIca. L. REv. 831; Freund, The Use of
Indefinite Terms in Statutes (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 437.
BoAnd in the first instance the court should go even so far as to apply the intent
of "a reasonable legislature." Horack, The Common Law of Legislation (1937)
23 IowA L. REv. 1941; 2 SuTHERAND, STATuTony CoNsmuczoN (3d ed. 1943)
§4508.
a1Cf. Rutledge, J., in Cleveland v. United States, 67 S.Ct. 13, 17-18 (1946):
"At times political considerations may work to forbid taking corrective action.
And in such cases, as well as others ,there may be a strong and proper tendency
to trust to the courts to correct their own errors . .. as they ought to do
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-with this proposition. If there are political obstacles they should be
given great weight, for regardless of motive32 it means that the pro-
posed policy is not one which Congress is prepared to support and
that the Court is changing the law when the elected representatives
would not.
The second difficulty -with the argument is that it applies equally
to support the proposition that the Court should not change its prior
interpretation. If silence is something less than concurrence in the
first decision then it is also less than concurrence in the changed
policy announced in the second case. In other words, the silence is
ambiguous and you can argue as satisfactorily in support of the first
decision as you can in support of the second. Thus, as a matter of
statutory construction, silence alone or ambiguous re-enactment does
not support the second interpretation." The argument goes further,
however, and runs to the effect that in the case of silence the Court
should be in a position to correct its own error."- This argument
assumes the very point at issue-that is, that the first interpretation
was erroneous.
If the determination of policy is a question for the Court, then
clearly if the Court changes its mind it may appropriately say its
first decision was erroneous. But if the determination of policy is
for Congress then an independent determination by the Court that
its first determination was unwise is not the same thing as saying
that it was erroneous. For the policy of the legislature may have
been unwise and so long as it is not unconstitutional the Court must
apply the policy. And in this situation a reversal of the prior decision
would be the erroneous action if Congress had not changed its policy.
when experience has confirmed or demonstrated the error's existence." This,
of course, assumes the existence of original error. And it also assumes that in the
absence of evidence of subsequent congressional intent the Court should provide
a legislative policy for society.
82"Not only may the reasons which prompted the various members to enact
the law be varied and conflicting and difficult to determine, but they may be un-
related to any consideration of the meaning of the statute." 2 SUTHERIAD, STATU-
ToRy ConsTaucrzon (3d ed. 1943) §5014.
Cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87, 130 (U.S. 1810): ". . if less than a majority
act from impure motives, the principle by which judicial interference would be
regulated, is not clearly discerned."
asStone, C. J., dissenting in Girouard v. United States, 66 S.Ct. 826, 833 (1946).
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"Moreover . . . this legislation and the problems presented by the cases arising
under it are of such a character as does not allow this Court properly to shift to
Congress the responsibility for perpetuating the Court's error." Rutledge, J., con-
curring, Cleveland v. United States, 67 S.Ct. 13, 17 (1946).
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Thus, the doctrine of the majority in the Girouard case certainly
cannot be approved categorically. But neither can that of the minority
if its position is that re-enactment per se binds the Court to its first.
interpretation. 5  The need for nice adjustment in the complicated
machinery of government does not permit of an exact rule. Little
more than a broad policy can be announced; that policy appears to
be best expressed in the proposition that in case of doubt the Court
should not reverse a prior decision interpreting a congressional en-
actment. In the Girouard case the minority found sufficient evidence
to dispel doubt. It also found a reaffirmation of the policy announced
in the earlier cases.
m.
Without discussion of the policy questions above raised, the minority
reached its conclusions by the application of standard rules of statutory
construction. This process, of course, offers no clear and simple path
to a certain legislative intent. But inasmuch as all legislative intent
in the end becomes more than the sum of all its parts, it should be
recognized that the lack of evidence alone or the lack of action alone
does not necessarily preclude the existence of a legislative intent or
its discovery. 6 This is apparently recognized by both majority and
minority.
There was substantial agreement in the Girouard case upon the
facts. After the original decisions, strong representations were made
to Congress and its committees by persons of prominence both within
and without the government. These representations continued over
a period of years3 7 and the committee finally reported out a bill which
became the Nationality Act of 1940. The provisions of the Act in-
volved in the Girouard litigation were the provisions of the 1906 Act
reinacted without substantial change.
35 1t is clear that this is not the intent of the minority. "It is the responsibility
of Congress, in reanacting a statute to make known its purpose in a controversial
matter of interpretation of its former language, at least when the matter has,
for over a decade, been persistently brought to its attention. In light of this legis-
lative history it is abundantly clear that Congress has performed that duty." Stone,
C. J., dissenting in Girouard v. United States, 66 S.Ct. 826, 833 (1946).
8*"If legislative intent has meaning for the interpretative process it means not
a collection of subjective wishes, hopes and prejudices of individuals, but rather
the objective footprints left on the trail of legislative enactment. Legislative intent
can't be 'dreamed up.' It may be speculated about; but it can be discovered only
by factual inquiry into the history of the enactment of the statute. . ." 2 SUTHR-
LAND, STATuToRy CoNsmuracno (3d ed. 1943) §4506.
8TSee dissenting opinion, Girouard v. United States, 66 S.Ct. 826, 832 (1946).
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The committee reports did not disclose the controversy that fol-
lowed the decisions in the Macintosh, Schwimmer and Bland cases;38
-indeed, they did not disclose that the committee had even considered
the question. The committee hearings, however, made it clear that
the issue was before the committee. When the proposed act was
presented on the floor of Congress the provisions at issue were in
substantially the same form that they were in in the Act of 1906. No
objection was made on the floor of Congress. There were no champions
to insist that the nature of the oath be changed. The act passed and
the reanacted portions added nothing to the evidence available at
the time of the Macintosh, Schwimmer and Bland cases.
What did the reanactment mean? It is submitted that if anyone
could tell what it meant there would have been little difficulty in
the Girouard case. If the reanactment meant the rejection of the
requirements of the oath it seems clear that the dissenters would have
eagerly joined the majority. If it had been clear that the regnact-
ment affirmed the requirements of the original act it may be premised
that the majority would have joined with the dissenters unless they
found a constitutional issue had been raised. Thus, the rules of
statutory construction are not helpful unless the rule that con-
gressional inaction after prior interpretation is treated as a presump-
tion that the law remains unchanged until affirmative action of Con-
gress is established. This, in reality, is another way of speaking of
legislative supremacy when there is doubt as to legislative policy.
It may, of course, be argued, and has been, that the very inaction
itself is evidence of legislative intent, but for most purposes this
seems unsatisfactory.
The majority in the Girouard case advanced the proposition that
the necessary evidence of a change in policy was discoverable from
the other statutes which could be applied by analogy. This is a well
accepted concept of statutory interpretation" and if the analogous
statutes do provide evidence of legislative policy affecting the situa-
tion in litigation the policy should be followed. The difficulty in the
instant case is that there is nothing to indicate that the policy of one
statute was necessarily the policy of the other. Certainly there is no
requirement that Congress be consistent and even if there was it would
be difficult in the instant case to establish that the situations were
not distinguishable, as an effective argument could be made excluding
asUnited States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. (1931); United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644 (1929); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
393 SUTHmRLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943) $§6101-6105.
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the relevance of the 1942 amendments of the Nationality Act as was
made in establishing their analogy. The fact that they were amend-
ments does not entitle them to a higher priority in determining the
policy which Congress followed.40 The difficulty in applying amend-
ments is simply this: Congress could have applied one policy to
persons in the armed forces and another one to those who did not
participate in military service. The wisdom of such a distinction
was for Congress and not for the Court. The important question
remains unanswered, did Congress intend in 1942 to reverse the
prior policy for all persons or only for those in the armed forces?
Again on this question there is silence. The Court is faced with the
extremely difficult task of deciding a case where it is aware that
strong sympathies run contra to the announced policy of its prior
decision, which decision it believes to be erroneous, where there is
no evidence determinative of the policy which Congress has fixed
and where because a case is before it the Court must act. Whatever
decision the Court makes results, as Radin said, in making the statute
more determinate.4' To that extent the Court's decision becomes a
part of the statute. To change the decision is to amend the statute.
The issue then is, whether the Court should assume the responsibility
in non-constitutional cases of making a decision which will change
the policy and law under which the people live or whether they should
leave this legislative function to the Congress. The assertion of this
power is not necessary to the exercise of the judicial function and
results in at least a temporary supremacy of the Court over purely
legislative policy issues.
401 SuTRLANxD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943) §1929-1935.
-See Radin, supra note 13, at 869.
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